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MAY I HAVE THIS DANCE?: ESTABLISHING A
LIABILITY STANDARD FOR INFRINGEMENT OF
CHOREOGRAPHIC WORKS
I. INTRODUCTION

Our country's Founding Fathers and the Framers of the United States
Constitution envisioned the protection of artists and creative thinkers when they
included the Copyright Clause' as one of the fundamental rights of this nation's
citizens. Although no one knows exactly when people first began to dance,2 it is
known, however, that elements of dance date back to Biblical and pre-historic
times, and existed in all societies, regardless of cultural or racial origin.' Even
today, the creative and artistic expressions of dance can be seen in one's favorite
nightclub, music video, or Broadway production.
Though dancing has been a consistent aspect of our nation's history and
culture, it has not received the same level of statutory protection as other forms
of art. The first copyright statute was enacted in May 1790, but dance did not
receive federal statutory protection until the Copyright Act of 1976 [hereinafter
the Act], which added "pantomimes and choreographic works" as "original works
of authorship."4 Although choreographic works are technically protected from
piracy and exploitation, the current state of the law-in practical effect-still
leaves choreographers vulnerable to theft of their creative efforts. These are the
same creative efforts that the Framers and Founding Fathers envisioned would
be protected by the words of our Constitution.'
Consider the following hypothetical, specifically created to isolate and analyze
the pertinent issues facing choreographers under the current copyright statute:
Elise Payton [hereinafter Ms. Elise] owns, operates, and is the principle
choreographer for the Arabesque Dance Academy [hereinafter Arabesque]. This
studio offers various dance classes (e.g., tap, jazz, ballet, hip-hop, shag, modem,
etc.) to students from age two to adult. There are several advanced performing
ensembles within Arabesque who showcase routines throughout the state and

' "The Congress shall have Power... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by

securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries....U".S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
8.
2 Dance: Histoy, Microsoft & Encarta Onne Enyclopedia, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/
refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid.761572134&pn= I#s7 (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
3 Id
4 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(a) (2000); seegenera/l# CRAIGJOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 20,22 (5th ed.

2001 Reprint).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
8.
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nation, in an effort to promote the studio and Ms. Elise's expertise. Each year,
Arabesque presents a for-profit spring concert where each advanced ensemble
performs several of Ms. Elise's choreographicworks for the community.
One day, Ms. Elise is flipping through the television stations and catches a
glimpse of a Janet Jackson music video. Janet is one of Ms. Elise's favorite
performers, and Ms. Elise decides that it would be a good idea to have a Janet
Jackson theme for the upcoming spring concert. In order to accomplish this goal,
Ms. Elise decides to record an upcoming MTV 6 special that will broadcast the
next week. This program includes interviews with Janet's choreographer, Lisa,7
and shows a chronology of Janet's most popular music videos.
Over the following weeks and months, Ms. Elise studies choreographic
sequences from the videos. Upon mastering these sequences, she proceeds to
incorporate them into her own choreography, which she subsequently teaches to
her students at Arabesque. The Arabesque dance ensemble students learn these
routines, which include the choreographic sequences that Ms. Elise "borrowed"
from theJanetJackson videos, and ultimately perform them at the spring concert,
where audience members pay an eight dollar admission price.
What type of liability exists for such actions of infringement? How is Lisa, the
original choreographer of the pirated sequences, able to protect her creative and
artistic efforts? Does Ms. Elise have a defense of "fair use"9 against the alleged
infringement of Lisa's copyright? What are the available remedies?
The above hypothetical scenario illustrates many of the concerns of the dance
community as well as many of the weaknesses of current statutory protection."
The succeeding pages will explore current liability standards in various aspects of
copyright law, and attempt to establish a standard of liability for the infringement
of choreographic works that will be practically feasible to the dance community
while at the same time retaining the fundamental elements that are the essence of
copyright law.

6 Music Television (MTV), a trademark of MTV Networks, is a cable television station,
targeting teenagers and youth in their twenties, that offers viewers music programming and up-tothe-minute news from the music industry. See MTVNetworks, at http://www.mtv.com/sitewide/
mtvinfo/faq/onair/onairA6.jhtml#ql (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
For the purposes of the following analysis, it will be assumed that Lisa has satisfied the
requirements for registering her choreographic work under the Act. See discussion of requirements,
infra pp. 439-440.
s For the purposes of this analysis, we are assuming that Lisa somehow finds out about the
piracy of her choreographic works by Ms. Elise.
' The Doctrine of Fair Use is a limitation on the exclusive rights that authors have under the
Act. See 17 U.S.C. S 107 (2000).
10The

following analysis will not consider the issue of compilations as it relates to this topic.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. STATUTORY REFERENCES
This section will discuss the statutory terms of the Act which are most relevant
to a complete understanding of the issue at hand. At the forefront of this analysis
will be the terms which fundamentally establish the requirements of a
copyrightable work. Many of the terms derive their power from the Constitution
as well as the Act; accordingly, these sources will be highlighted.
The Act, and its most recent amendments, provides protection for
"[w]ritings"'' of "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."' 2 Therefore, the two main requirements for copyright
protection are "originality" and "fixation".
The United States Supreme Court decided that "writings," as found in the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, "may be interpreted to include any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor."' 3 Therefore,
under this interpretation, all of the works listed in section 102(a) of the Act are
considered "writings" in the constitutional sense. Since "[i]t is clear, then, that
nothing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly
unique or novel,... [a]ll that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the
statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial'
variation, something recognizably 'his own.' ""
Although the standard of
originality is minimal, some works will, nevertheless, not be copyrightable because
they lack the requisite level of creativity.
The term "author... "has been construed [by the Supreme Court] to mean an
'originator,' 'he to whom anything owes its origin.' "'s The fixation requirement
means that the medium of fixation must be "sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration."' 7 The broad language of the Act prevents
"artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions" that may be drawn between

1tU.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
12 17 U.S.C. S 102(a) (2000).
11Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 561,178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129, 135 (1973).
" Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99,102-03,90 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 153,157
(2d Cir. 1951).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d.8.
16 Golstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53,58
(1884)).
"1 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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different mediums of expression.'8 A bright line is also drawn between statutory
and common law copyright protection by the language of the fixation require19
ment.
Under the statutory requirements, Lisa would be the "author" of the
choreographic work, since it originated from her creative efforts; and, by
definition, the choreographic work itself constitutes a "writing" because it is a
physical manifestation of the choreographer's creative labor. The originality of
the work is signified by Lisa's "own" artistic efforts in combining and arranging
"social dance steps and simple routines" (which are both excluded as individually
copyrightable items)' into a distinctive choreographic sequence or work. In
order to comply with the fixation requirement, Lisa has resorted to videotape-one of the various forms available for capturing choreography: dance
notation (also called "choreology"), 2 videotape, motion pictures and
videographics.22 Since the essence of choreographic works is performance, the
fixation requirement is arguably unnecessary and a barrier to the creativity of
choreographers.'
The one element of the Act that has created confusion among the dance
community is the lack of a positive definition of choreographic work. In
amending the Act to include choreographic works, Congress believed the term
"choreographic work[]" to possess a "fairly settled meaning[]," thus leaving the
dance community with a definition so vague that the scope of copyright
protection is indeterminable.24

15

JOYCE ET AL., .ipra
note 4, at 73.

'9 Id Works that do not satisfy the fixation requirement as set forth by the statute may still be
eligible for state common law or statutory protection. Federal protection, however, is only available
for works that satisfy section 102.
20 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53-54 (1976), repnrntedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
21 Leslie Erin Wallis, The DjfferentArt: Chorrograpyand Copynght, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1442, 1462
(1986).
22 Id at 1446, n.31.
2 See id at 1444-47. See also Barbara A. Singer, In Search ofAdequate Protectionfor Choreographic
Works: Legislative andJudiaalAlternatvesv. The Custom of the Dance Community, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV.
287, 301-03 (1984) (purporting that "the fixation requirement creates a formidable obstacle to the
registration of choreographic works" because the currently available methods of fixation are
prohibitively costly, especially for less wealthy choreographers. There is also argument that dance
notations unsatisfactorily "capture style or individual interpretation" of the choreography, while
audiovisual methods "are not very useful to the choreographer or reconstructor wishing to observe
isolated movements[,j ... cannot convey the three dimensional nature of dance[,] ... and provide[]
a mirror image of the dance, reversing left and right.").
24 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 5667. See also Wallis, supra note 21, at 1452-55 (noting that "the
current 'negative' definition of choreographic works does not provide adequate copyright
protection").
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B. HORGAN V. MACMILLAN, INC.25

Not until 1986 did the dance community receive its first major judicial
interpretation of the Act, as applied to the newly protected category of choreographic works. The issue in Hogan arose when the estate of renowned choreographer George Balanchine sought an injunction against the MacMillan publishing
company to prevent the release of a book (The Nutcracken A Story & a Balle),
which contained still photographs of Balanchine's choreographic production of
The Nutcracker, as performed by the New York City Ballet ("NYCB").26
In December 1981, Balanchine registered his version of The Nutcrackerballet
and deposited a videotape recording of the NYCB's dress rehearsal with the U.S.
Copyright Office. Upon his death, Ms. Barbara Horgan, who had been
Balanchine's personal assistant, became executrix of the estate. Horgan became
aware of MacMillan's intention to publish said book, in April 1985, when she
received "galleys of a text and photocopies of photographs," which "were
'virtually identical' to the final version of the book, published some six months
later in October 1985. "27 The heart of the dispute rests upon sixty color
photographs that present a sequential depiction of the NYCB's production of The
Nutcracker ballet from beginning to end. The ultimate issue of this case was
"whether still photographs of a ballet [could] infringe the copyright on the
choreography for the ballet."2 DistrictJudge Owen, of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, ruled that MacMillan had not
infringed the choreographic copyright because "choreography has to do with the
flow of the steps in a ballet. The still photographs.., catch dancers in various
attitudes at specific instants of time; they do not, nor do they intend to, take or
use the underlying choreography. The staged performance could not be recreated
29
from them."
On appeal to the Second Circuit, ChiefJudge Feinberg reversed and remanded
on the grounds that "the district court applied the wrong legal standard for
determining whether the photographs infringe the copyrighted
30
choreography... ."
Because Congress had not specified a statutory definition
for choreographic works, the Court considered definitions offered by The

25

789 F.2d 157,229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 684 (2d Cir. 1986). This was a case of first impression for

the Second Circuit.
26 id

" Id at 159. Apparently the photos were taken by two photographers who were considered
"'official photographers' of the [NYCBJ" and thus authorized by Balanchine to do so. Id
28 Id at 160.
29 Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1169,1170,227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 975,976 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), rv'd,789 F.2d 157, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 684 (2d Cir. 1986).
30 Horan,789 F.2d at 158.
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Compendium of Copyright Office Practices, Compendium 11 (1984) in its
analysis." Horgan argued that the book was an impermissible " 'copy' of
Balanchine's copyrighted work because it portray[ed] the essence of the
Balanchine Nutcracker, or, in the alternative, that the book [was] an infringing
'derivative work.' ,3 2 In this respect, Horgan implied that the district court should
have used a substantial similarity test (i.e. "whether the alleged copy is substantially similar to the original")," while MacMillan countered by arguing that the
photographs were not substantially similar because they were a different medium
of expression that do not capture the essence of Balanchine's choreography,
which is "movement"., 34
Feinberg's opinion hinted at the possibility of photographs being an
infringement of a choreographic work due to the amount of information a
photograph could communicate to an observer. 3 The ultimate issue of
infringement, however, was not decided by this case, nor has it been presented to
another court for adjudication. Prior to the remand proceeding, the parties in
Horgan reached an out-of-court settlement.36 Consequently, "there is still no
judicial investigation of choreographic copyright infringement and the dance
community must await a future opportunity to observe and assess how the
judiciary will enforce their rights."3
C. THE CUSTOM OF THE DANCE COMMUNITY3

The following analysis presents the practical issues relating to the copyright
infringement puzzle from a perspective much different from, but equally as
Choreography is the composition and arrangement of dance movements and
patterns, and is usually intended to be accompanied by music. Dance is static
and kinetic successions of bodily movement in certain rhythmic and spatial
relationships. Choreographic works need not tell a story in order to be protected
by copyright.
Id at 161 (quoting Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices § 450.01 (1984)).
32 Id
33 Id The Court appeared to agree with Horgan's proposition, stating "[t]he test.., is whether
'the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." Id at 162 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.)).
' Id at 161-62. MacMillan also asserted that the photographs captured uncopyrightable
material, which was indistinguishable from the Balanchine choreography similarly captured in the
photographs. Id at 162.
3 Horgan,789 F.2d at 163.
Patricia Solan Glennerich, One Moment in Time: The Second Circuit Ponders Choreographic
Photographyar a CopyrightInfringement, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 379, 382 (1987).
37Id
38Singer, supra note 23, at 287.
31
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important as, the legal perspective. Before analyzing the applicability of the Act
to the concept of choreography, it is important to understand the culture of the
dance community.39 From understanding this culture, one will be better able to
appreciate the need for a standard of liability which upholds the values of the
dance community as well as adequately addresses the community's concerns and
needs. For what good is a rule that has an impractical and useless effect, but for
the formality of having a rule?
In Barbara N. Singer's law review article,' she discusses the customs of the
dance community in relation to the copyright statute.4' Singer points out that
"the vast majority of choreographers"4' 2 have not taken advantage of the
opportunity to register their work under the requirements of the Act because
many of them feel that the customs of the dance community more adequately
address their needs than do the provisions of the Act.43 In presenting this
analysis, Singer focuses on the means of "choreographic credit" and "choreographic control" that are predominant in the dance community and utilized in all
aspects surrounding choreographic works-from creation to performance (or
production).
Choreographic credit is the practice of "attaching" the choreographer's name
to every performance of the work without regard to whether the choreographer,
her company or some other entity has legal ownership of the work." Choreographic credit is generally accomplished by announcing the choreographer's name
immediately prior to the work's performance and/or listing the choreographer in
the performance handbill. In this way, the audience is sufficiently informed of the
"author" of the work, thereby preventing confusion as to its creative and artistic
origin.

" Having been a member of the dance community for fifteen years as a student and instructor,
I will include my own experiences as they relate to relevant cultural attitudes of the dance community
as well as my understanding of particular aspects of the community.
o Singer, rupra note 23.
41 See supra notes 21-23 (discussing similar theories regarding the dance
community and the
inadequacy of the copyright statute in addressing its needs).
42 Singer, supra note 23, at 289.
43 Singer notes:
[Elven those choreographers who have registered their works have been
reluctant to enforce their statutory rights in a court oflaw. Choreographers have
not eschewed the statutory mechanism for enforcing their rights because they are
unaware that an enforcement mechanism exists. Instead, they have rejected this
form of protection from a belief that the customs of their own community offer
equal, if not superior, protection for choreographic works.
Id at 290 (citation omitted).
44 Id at 292-93.
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The dance community customarily grants choreographic control by allowing
a choreographer to "control" her works beyond the point at which they have been
"released" to the public through performance or production. 5 When owners of
dance companies desire to produce a choreographer's work, they obtain
permission directly from the choreographer or her representative to do so. 46 The
parties then enter into a licensing agreement, whereby the licensee has the right
to a specified number of performances of the work for a predetermined period
of time. The licensee pays a licensing fee for the performance right and royalties
for each performance. Under the terms of the agreement, however, the
choreographer still retains "artistic control" through her ability to supervise
rehearsals, participate in the staging of the work, and provide authorization for
any choreographic changes to the work. The choreographer also has the ultimate
right to withdraw the work from the licensee if she feels that the dance ensemble
is no longer capable of performing the work with sufficient artistic integrity.
Although the choreographer has the withdrawal right, this type of safeguard is
limited to those within the dance community who respect the sanctions of the
dance community.
Although Singer notes the rarity of breaches of custom, she points out that
even in the face of such breaches, the dance community is still reluctant to seek
remedies from the legal world because
choreographers view unlicensed performances as a risk of the
trade... or free publicity[,] .... prefer to rely on negotiation or peer
pressure in settling their differences with breaching licensees[,]....
are discouraged by the costs involved in bringing suit... that may
strain the budget and patience of struggling choreographers [,] ....
[realize that] the small amounts of lost profit resulting from the
breach ... fail to justify legal effort[,] . . . [and fear that] legal
enforcement of the contract may not offer [her] much relief[]
especially if the choreographer is not in a position of equal bargaining power.
Therefore, ultimately, the dance community feels that resorting to protective
methods outside of the community itself (i.e., from the legal profession) is

45 Id

at 293.

' Prior to giving authorization, the choreographer "visits the company to determine the

company's capability of performing the dance .... evaluates both the technical abilities and the
personalities of the company dancers.... [and] will permit the performance of [her] work only after
being convinced that the skills of the company reflect the artistic worth of the composition." Id at
294.
47Singer, supranote 23, at 296.
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unnecessary and likely to be less effective since the community customs alone
appear to sufficiently address choreographers' needs.
The dance community also believes that the current provisions of the Act
illustrate, precisely, the lack of understanding that those outside the dance
community have regarding the art of choreography and the dance community
itself. First, the dance community utilizes a much broader definition of
choreography than that which is captured in the provisions of the Act. Singer's
article contends that "[a]mong members of that community, choreography is
loosely defined as anything a choreographer presents to the public"48 without
regard to manner or form of creation. Conversely, the drafters of the Act
intended to construct a provision with certain standards of originality. The Act
itself does not even contain a specific meaning for "choreographic work" in
Section 101 ("Definitions"). Intentionally leaving the definition of "choreographic works" undefined-because they felt that the category had a "fairly settled
meaning[]-the drafters' only statement regarding the definition of this category
of work was that it was not "necessary to specify that 'choreographic works' do
4' 9
not include social dance steps and simple routines."
In the eyes of the dance community, such a characterization of choreography
effectuates the creation of a minimum level of difficulty that must be met before
a work can be protected. This threshold requirement may ultimately result in the
uncopyrightability of works that are highly innovative and/or very simplistic
because they are grounded in such basic or common components."0 Additionally,
the dance community worries that the requirement that copyrightable works
promote the useful arts will be used by the legal system to "judge the moral worth
of choreographic works" and believes that this bias, which is constitutionally
based, will be harder to overcome in the effort to gain sufficient protection for
choreographic works."' It appears, therefore, that the dance community disagrees
with the well-established meaning that the drafters of the Act believed the term
"choreographic works" to have.
Secondly, choreographers are concerned with the "originality" requirement of
the Act. 2 Since the courts, as of yet, have not determined the level of originality
necessary for choreographic works, the dance community worries about how this

48

Id at 297.

49 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 53-54 (1976).

soSinger, .rupra note 23, at 297-98. This type of characterization of choreography would mean
that choreographic works composed solely of social dance steps or elemental techniques may not
reach the level of difficulty necessary for protection.
s'Id at 299. Apparently, as Singer notes, choreographers' refusal to register their works under
the Act is also their refusal to offer "tacit approval [of] the statutory and case law definitions of
choreography that they ...find so offensive." Id
52

Id at 300.
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eventual determination will affect the protection that is ultimately provided to
choreographic works. Because a choreographic work potentially consists of
individual dance steps, which themselves are not copyrightable, a judicial
determination of the level of originality needed for copyright protection could
render many choreographers' works uncopyrightable. This result could be
devastating to the dance community. The dance community, however, believes
that a choreographer's work should be copyrightable "[a] s long as the dance bears
the choreographer's individual stamp [i.e. "the choreographer's treatment of
rhythm, space and movement in the work ' 3] .. . [regardless of whether her]
dance uses well-known or often-used steps."' These competing notions present
a problem that will need to be resolved before there can be adequate protection
of choreographic works. The dance community, however, fears that the court's
lack of knowledge regarding choreography will hinder its ability to make the
artistic and creative decisions necessary to accomplish such a task.
Finally, choreographers view the fixation requirement as a technical burden
that is unnecessary for copyrightability5 5 My personal experience in the dance
community demonstrated exactly how temporal the creation of a choreographic
work can be. Often, choreographers begin the creation of a choreographic work
with only a few steps or techniques in mind. Much of the creative process is trial
and error, as the choreographer listens to the music, throws out ideas, and
suggests various movements to the dancers to see if they "go" with the music and
with the choreographer's overall artistic concept for the choreographic work.5 6
It is this artistic concept, the "totality" of the choreographic work, that the dance
community believes should be captured with fixation.5" The Act's provisions
themselves, however, only require that enough of the choreographic work be
fixed so that it may "be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of more than transitory duration." 8 Similarly, there must be enough of
the work presented to later prove infringement, if necessary. Though several
forms of fixation are currently available to the dance community, most often, the
most effective method will depend upon the purpose for which the choreogra-

53 Ir

5 Singer, supra note 23, at 300.
s This principle is given an in-depth discussion in Anne K. Weinhardt, Copyrigbt Infringament of
Choreography: The Le aIAspecas of Fixation,13 J. CORP. L. 839 (1988).
5' Also embedded in this process is a consideration of the dancers' technical skill levels, which
often play a large part in determining which movements to incorporate into the choreographic work.
57For the dance community, the "totality extends beyond the mere movements through space
and time to include the feelings, emotions, and sensations which are conveyed by the choreographic

piece when all the parts come together to form the dance." Weinhardt, supra note 55, at 855.
- 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss2/13

10

Watkins: May I Have This Dance?: Establishing a Liability Standard for Inf

2003]

MAY I HAVE THIS DANCE?

pher is copyrighting her work. 9 Additionally, the choreographer will have to
consider the effectiveness, cost, convenience, and ease of use (and/or understanding) in court of the fixation method chosen. The lack of litigation on this issue
has also left an unanswered question regarding a more specific definition of
publication, which will also weigh greatly on the method of fixation required.'
In essence, the fixation requirement leaves many uncertainties (both legally and
practically) that will need to be clarified before choreographic works can be
protected effectively.
Although the dance community strongly believes that its customs will
adequately protect its interests, what happens when those who are traditionally
outside the sanctions of the dance community "pirate" a choreographer's work?
It is true that the judicial system has not currently had the opportunity to establish
either limitations for or the scope of relevant provisions of the Act. However, the
future success of the dance community may become so threatened by piracy from
outside the traditional realm that the need and desire for judicial interpretation of
statutory provisions will become inevitably necessary.
III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF A COPYRIGHT HOLDER RELATING TO INFRINGEMENT

The uniqueness of choreographic works as a category of copyrightable works
provides a challenge for establishing an adequate standard of liability. The use of
independently uncopyrightable steps, which may be incorporated into a larger
work that is itself copyrightable, creates a complex situation for determining that
sufficient originality exists to satisfy the statutory requirements. Conversely, the
overwhelming importance of the performance right to the survival (and potential
piracy) of a choreographic work seemingly outweighs other statutory considerations.

59 See Weinhardt, mpranote 55, at 855-56 (observing that the Register of Copyright differentiates
between the requirements for published and unpublished works). Only a "complete copy" of the
work sought to be protected is required for unpublished works while a "best edition" is required for
published works. These varied standards will ultimately influence the means of fixation; because if

a means of fixation is used that ineffectively captures the elements needed for copyright protection,
the choreographer's work will be left vulnerable to piracy. Id
6oBecause the work's status as "published" versus "unpublished" ultimately determines the type
of copy (a "complete copy" or a "best edition') that needs to be registered with the Copyright
Office, a specific definition of what constitutes publication for a choreographic work will be
necessary in making this determination. Currently, no such determination exists.
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The Act provides the following exclusive rights to the owner of the
copyright:6
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies...;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the
public...;
(4) in the case of. .. choreographic works, . . . to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of. . . choreographic
works, . . . to display the
6 2
copyrighted work publicly ....
Arguably, the dance community holds the rights of display, performance, and
preparation of derivative works to be the most economically valuable of the
exclusive rights protected under the Act. It is these rights that truly capture the
purpose of a choreographic work-to be exhibited on a stage for the enjoyment
of an audience. Therefore, the very essence of the Act, which is to protect
unauthorized copying of an author's work, seemingly provides little benefit to
choreographers and the dance community.3
In order to infringe upon a holder's copyright, there must be proof of
ownership of a valid copyright' by the plaintiff and proof of substantial copying
by the defendant (i.e., the alleged infringer), which results in a violation of one of
the copyright holder's exclusive rights. 6' Because copyright infringement is a
strict liability act, no intent or actual negligence is required on the part of the
alleged infringer. The mere act of copying, which later turns out to be unlawful,
of a protected work is sufficient to hold the alleged infringer liable for violating

6' The owner of the copyright is typically called the copyright holder, who can potentially be
different from the author or creator of the protected work. Likewise, the copyright holder's rights
may be "unbundled" and individually transferred or assigned to others. But for simplicity of the
discussion here, the copyright owner and choreographer will be one and the same person. The
assignment or transfer of rights will not be considered herein.
62 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). The exclusive right "(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission" will not be discussed herein
and therefore has been excluded from the list above. Id.
63 Singer, slpra note 23, at 304-05.

that "[iln any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within
five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of
the copyright... [but] [tlhe evidentiary weight to be accorded... shall be within the discretion of
the court." 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
6s "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... or of the
author.., is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be." 17 U.S.C. 5
6Note

501 (a)(2000).
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the copyright holder's exclusive rights. Thereafter, the copyright holder has
several remedial options available, ranging from injunctive relief to actual litigious
proceedings (both criminal and civil) against the infringer."
The process does not end with a determination of infringement because the
alleged infringer may then assert some counter-argument or defense. The
Doctrine of Fair Use provides the most common" limitation on the exclusive
rights of the copyright holder.' Arguably a defense to copyright infringement,
fair use provides some degree of legal justification for the taking of another's
creative efforts.69 Because of its complex nature, fair use is determined on a caseby-case basis, with specific attention paid to the facts as they relate to the four
statutory factors.7
The following will begin the analysis of various other liability standards that
may prove helpful in establishing the same for choreographic works. Cases will
be presented to introduce the fundamental tests or standards for applying the
relevant provisions of the Act (i.e., those relating to the exclusive rights to prepare
derivative works, to display the copyrighted work publicly, and to perform the
work publicly). These concepts will then be applied to choreographic works,
particularly with regard to the hypothetical presented earlier. In analyzing the
categories of copyrightable works, there appears to be a significant amount of
similarity between choreographic works and musical compositions. As the
analysis progresses, these parallelisms will be highlighted for consideration. In
comparing choreographic works to musical compositions, particular care will be
given to the Copyright Office's practices in handling these two items. 7' The

67

Seegeneral# 17 U.S.C. % 501-505 (2000) (listing remedies for copyright infringement).
See Gennerich, supra note 36, at 401, n.92.

6 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). "mTlhe fair use of a copyrighted work ...

for purposes such as

criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright." Id The following factors are listed to aid, but are not dispositive or exhaustive, in the
determination of fair use:
1. the purpose and character of the use...;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.

Id

69 The drafters of the Act describe it as "an equitable rule of reason" that has been previously
given much judicial consideration, and that this statutory provision is "intended to restate the present
judicial doctrine... not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-

66 (1976).
70 ia
71 See general4libraryof Congress. Copyright Office, COMPENDIUM II OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE

PRACTICES (1984) (depicting the Copyright Office's guidelines for examining copyright claims under
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attention given to the discussion of musical compositions will then be utilized (by
analogy) to facilitate the establishment of a liability standard for choreographic

works.
B. THE ADAPTATION RIGHT

2

Section 106(2) of the Act allows the copyright holder to prepare derivative
works" based upon the copyrighted work. By allowing for adaptations, the Act
expands the definition of "copying" to include much broader concepts than
would traditionally be considered. Without the adaptation right, however, the Act
would only provide copyright holders with protection for verbatim copying that
was in the same medium of expression as the original copyrighted work.74 The
author of the derivative work does not merely "copy" (as used in the traditional
sense) the preexisting work but, rather, adds her own creative expression to create
an entirely new work worthy of its own individual copyright protection.
Therefore, the Act essentially protects "the material contributed by the author of
[the derivative] work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in
the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material"
because the copyright in the derivative work "is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material."" But unlike the underlying work, some
derivative works need not be fixed in tangible mediums to be an infringement of
the underlying work.7 The lack of a fixation requirement for some derivative
works, such as derivative choreographic works, increases the category of works
that could potentially infringe upon a copyrighted work, in a manner that makes
copyright holders more vulnerable to piracy.

the 1976 Copyright Act). This source is not a "rule book" but rather a starting point from which
the staff of the Copyright Office begins its analysis of copyright claims.
72This right is termed the adaptation right because the Act permits the copyright owner to adapt
or to transform the preexisting copyrighted work into other forms of expression. Further discussion
on this topic follows.
" A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works ... or any
[] form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted" induding "editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship...." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
" SeeJOYCE Er AL., spranote 4, at 518.
7517 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000).
76The drafters of the Act specifically noted that "the preparation of a derivative work, such as
a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even though nothing is
ever fixed in a tangible form." HR. REP. No. 94-1476 at 62.
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In order to infringe upon the adaptation right, "the infringing work must
incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form."77 The courts have
established various standards by which to determine if an alleged infringer has
violated the copyright holder's adaptation right.
Williams v. Broadus illustrates that once the court determines that the
preexisting work has been copied, particular attention is then given to whether or
not the alleged infringer's work is substantially similar79 to the copyrighted work,
thereby amounting to an "unlawful appropriation" ' by the alleged infringer. An
infringing derivative work does not exist, however, if "a secondary work
transforms the expression of the original work such that the two works cease to
be substantially similar."'"
Therein, defendant Broadus (more popularly known as rapper Snoop Dogg),
is accused of infringing plaintiff Williams' adaptation right to the song "The
Symphony." Broadus created a song entitled "Ghetto Symphony," which
included lyrics and music from plaintiff's song, without plaintiff's permission.8 2
Before the court could decide whether Broadus had infringed Williams'
adaptation right, there had to be a determination of whether Williams had
infringed the adaptation right to Ottis Redding's "Hard to Handle."'83
Williams copied (or sampled)" the opening two measures, which consisted of
ten notes-one five note ascension phrase and one five note descension
phrase-from a total of 54 measures in "Hard to Handle."" The court ultimately
determined that Williams' song was not a derivative work of the Redding
composition, but rather a "fragmented literal similarity" because even though
"parts of the pre-existing work [were] copied . .. note for note[ ] in the new

77id
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
78 2001 WL 984714, at *1;
79This concept of substantial similarity, which is vague and usually fact intensive, will be seen
throughout the following analysis as the relevant standard for determining copyright infringement
liability.
0 Williams, 2001 WL 984714, at *3.Note that the ultimate issue of Broadus' infringement
liability is not decided in this case.
81 Id(citing I Nimmer § 3.01 at 3-3).
iId at *1.
Broadus sought to invalidate Williams' copyright for "The Symphony" under section 103(a)
of the Copyright Act, which forbids protection of parts of a derivative work that unlawfully use parts
of the preexisting work. Id
' The concept of "sampling" will also be used to describe the act of copying preexisting musical
compositions or recordings into new songs. Sampling is accomplished by digitally extracting parts
of a preexisting work from its master recording and entering it into a digital sampler, or by hiring
musicians to re-perform portions of the preexisting musical composition. Id at *1n.l.
'' Will'amr, 2001 WL 984714, at *3.
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work,"86 the sampled notes, in considering the totality of the musical compositions, did not amount to a substantial portion (neither quantitatively nor
qualitatively) of "Hard to Handle".
The following tests, offered and explained in Castle Rock Entertainment,Inc. v.
CarolPub/ishingGroup,Inc.,87 are used to determine the unlawful appropriation of
protected works:
"Substantial Similarity" test: "requires ...copying [be] quantitatively andqualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion that
infringement (actionable copying) has occurred . . . . [with] [t]he
qualitative component concem[ing] the copying of expression,
rather than ideas ...[and] [t]he quantitative component generally
concem[ing] the amount of the copyrighted work that is copied." 8
"Ordinary Observer" test: provides that "[t]wo works are substantially similar
where the 'ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal [of the two works]
as the same.' "89

'Total Concept and Feel" test: analyzes " 'the similarities in such aspects as
the total concept and feel, theme, characters, plot, sequence, pace, and setting' of
the original and the allegedly infringing works."9
test: "focuses upon copying of direct
"Fragmented Literal Similarity"
91
quotations or close paraphrasing."
"Comprehensive Nonliteral Similarity" test: "examines whether 'the
fundamental essence or structure of one work is duplicated in another.' "92
The court in Wilh'ams utilized the fragmented literal similarity test in ruling that
Williams had not created an infringing derivative work. The court noted that

Id at *3.
"150 F.3d 132, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (2d Cir. 1998). Therein, the court applied the
substantial similarity test to find that the authors and publishers of a trivia question book (The Seinfeld
Aptitude Test had infringed the copyright of the television program (Seinfela), whose scenes and
events had served as the exclusive inspiration for questions in the trivia book.
8 ld at 138.
Id at 139 (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1992)). See supra
note 33 (citing this test as stated by Judge Learned Hand in PeterPan Fabrics,Inc.).
' See Caste Rack, 150 F.3d at 140 (quoting Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir.

1996)).
" Id This test also includes the "de minimis doctrine of fragmented literal similarity," which
"allow[s] literal copying of a small and usually insignificant portion of the pre-existing work." See
Wilwams, 2001 WL 984714, at *3 (noting Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 720 F.2d
231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)).

92Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 140.
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fragmented literal similarity was most appropriate for cases in which the
preexisting work and the allegedly infringing work were captured in the same
medium of expression.93 The court in Wiliams rejected the use of the ordinary
observer (therein, listener) test, seeming to focus on the small quantity of
sampling by Williams of "Hard to Handle" that would not give the two works the
same aesthetic appeal, as required by that test.
In addition to ascertaining the status of an allegedly infringing work as a
derivative work, one must consider whether a license to create a derivative work
was obtained by the alleged infringer. If the alleged infringer has a license from
the copyright owner to create a derivative work, then that derivative work is not
an infringement.94
C. THE PUBLIC DISPLAY RIGHT

Under the provisions of the Act, copyright holders gained the right to display"
their copyrighted works publicly. 96 The addition of the public display right to the
Act represented the "first explicit statutory recognition in American copyright law
97
of an exclusive right to show a copyrighted work, or image of it, to the public."
Notice also that the concept of display includes directly showing the original work
as well as the projection of images of the copyrighted work, whether it is on a
screen or transmitted to some other electronic storage and retrieval device. 9 The
language of the Act and its legislative history indicate the application of this right
to all categories of copyrightable works, except sound recordings. 99 Moreover, the
Act limits protection to only "public""° displays of copyrighted material.

93 Wiffams, 2001 WL 984714, at *3 n.6.
94 "It appears to be well established that if one intends to create and commercially exploit a work
that is derivative of a copyrighted work, a license to do so must be obtained from the owner" that
basically gives "permission to use a part or all of the original work, which otherwise the copyright
laws would prohibit." Russell v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 303,198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 523 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
9' The Act specifies that "[to 'display' a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by
means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process .
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
96 17 U.S.C. § 106(5).
97 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976).
91 Id at 64.
" Id at 63. See a/so JOYCE ET AL., s pra note 4, at 593 (noting that the public display right is not
applicable to sound recordings).
To perform or display a work "publicly" meansto perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by dause (1) or to the public,
by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate
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Therefore, even if the display is unlawful or unauthorized, there can be no
actionable claim of infringement unless this display was also done "publicly".
Certain limitations also appear within the Act that define the scope of this
right, particularly in the face of emerging technologies, and of the copyright
holder's ability to control the display of copyrighted works. The First Sale
Doctrine,' 0' authorizes the lawful purchaser of a "copy" of a copyrighted work to
publicly display that "copy", without the copyright holder's permission. Section
110 exempts certain types of public display (and public performances for that
matter) from possible classification as copyright infringement. The terms of
section 111 further discuss the implications of infringement liability for the
television, cable and/or optical transmissions of copyrighted works. The intent
of these limitations "is to preserve the traditional privilege of the owner of a copy
to display it directly, but to place reasonable restrictions on the ability to display
it indirectly in such a way that the copyright owner's market for reproduction and
distribution of copies would be affected."' 2
The legislative history of the display right significantly clarifies many of the
nuances of this right. The drafters of this section wanted to ensure that the Act
emphasizes that the display right applies to "original works of art as well as to
reproductions of them," which follows from the understanding that "'copies' are
defined as including the material object 'in which the work is first fixed.""'03 The
term 'publicly', as defined in section 101, includes places open to the public as
well as any place where a "substantial" number of people outside of a family's
normal acquaintances and social circle are assembled. Congress, in drafting the
display right, attempted to demystify this provision by defining a family as "an
individual living alone, so that a gathering confined to the individual's social
acquaintances would normally be regarded as private."'" This categorization as
"private", however, is not extended to what Congress considers "semipublic"
places, like "clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and schools."' ' In essence,
Congress distinguishes such "semipublic" places as squarely falling into the
category of public locations where any display of a copyrighted work is subject to
a claim of infringement." 6

places and at the same time or at different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The performance portion of this definition will be discussed in the following
material.
101Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
102H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 80 (1976). See also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 596.
103H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 64 (1976).
104 Id

100Id
106Id
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Judicial decisions have further facilitated an understanding of the provisions
of the display right, particularly by adopting many of the drafters' intentions into
judicial law. Under the guise of section 106(5), the courts have expressly
determined that the Act applies the display right "broadly enough to encompass
indirect transmission to the ultimate public"'0 7 through "each and every method
by which [] images or sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up
and conveyed."'0 8 Moreover, the court in PrimeTime specifically noted that
requirement of public display pertains to "each step in the process by which a
protected work wends its way to its audience"" ° since "the definition of transmit
'is broad enough to include all conceivableforms andcombinationsof wired or wireless
communications media.' "110
Therein, the defendant satellite carrier, PrimeTime, allegedly infringed the
copyright of plaintiff National Football League (commonly referred to as the
"NFL") by transmitting secondary broadcasts of NFL games to PrimeTime's
Canadian carriers. The NFL simultaneously broadcasts and video records all of
its football games to later be registered for copyright protection. Although
PrimeTime had a "statutorily granted license to make satellite transmissions to its
subscribers in United States households that do not have adequate over-the-air
PrimeTime was not
broadcast reception from primary television stations,'
authorized to provide such service to its Canadian subscribers. Upon discovering
PrimeTime's actions, the NFL demanded such action to cease. PrimeTime
persisted, however, in justifying its actions by saying that the public display was
the downlink from the satellite to the Canadian homes, which constitutes action
in a foreign jurisdiction and beyond the Act's control. The court rejected this
argument, on the grounds that the display right applies to every step of a
transmission that ultimately reaches the public. Therefore, the primary uplink
(from the simultaneous broadcast to the satellite), just like the downlink is subject
to potential infringement liability. The court's decision in PrimeTime truly
illustrates the breadth of the display right, particularly its relation to various
known and unknown communications media.

107 National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10, 12, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1569 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693
F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)).
108Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 64 (1976), reprintedin1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678).
109PrimeTime, 211 F.3d at 12 (quoting David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp.
752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
110Id

"I

Id at 11.
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RIGHT

Previously found in the Copyright Act of 1909, the public performance right
only applied to "for profit" performances, which the Supreme Court, in Herbert
v. Shany Co., defined as any performance that "took place in a commercial
setting.".. 4 This interpretation led to confusing distinctions between what did and
did not constitute a commercial setting. Performances by schools and churches
as well as other nonprofit organizations, however, were generally not considered
to be for profit and were thus exempted from statutory control."'
6
Today, the provisions of the public performance right" do not include this
for profit requirement and therefore apply to all performances, regardless of
whether for profit or not, and all categories of copyrightable works, including
sound recordings. Congress, in drafting this Act, intended to "first... state the
public performance right in broad terms, and then to provide specific exemptions
for educational and other nonprofit uses.""' 7 This approach, although different
from that taken by the Copyright Act of 1909, appeared more reasonable, given
the line drawing problem between commercial and nonprofit organizations.
The courts have also adopted and recognized the abrogation of the for profit
9
requirement in the public performance right."' In LaSalle Music Publishers, the
court accepted plaintiff LaSalle Music's argument that the Act did not require
plaintiffs seeking copyright protection to plead or prove that the alleged
infringer's performance of the copyrighted work was for profit. The court
analyzed the legislative history of the Act to come to its determination that
Congress intentionally changed the for profit language from "the section granting
the bundle of rights" to "[a] 'not for profit' exemption.., now included in 17
U.S.C. § 110(4). '' 2° Ultimately, the court noted that any relevant exemptions to
the exclusive bundle of rights promulgated in section 106 "should be raised by the
defendant as an affirmative defense."''

112

"To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance or act it, either directly or by means

of any device or process..." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The Act goes on to emphasize that a "device"
or "process" relates to anything "now known or later developed." Id
113 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
114 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 4, at 554.
115 Id
116

17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).

n"H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976).
n SeegenerallyLaSalle Music Publishers, Inc. v. Highfill, 622 F. Supp. 168, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
63 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (affirming the abrogation of the "for profit" requirement in the Copyright Act
of 1976).
119 Id
120

Id at 169.

121

I
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Like the public display right, the public performance right contains many of
the same provisions previously discussed. The scope of the public performance
right is specifically limited to those performances that are "public",' irrespective
of whether the performance is of the original rendition or any other method by
which the performance may be transmitted to the public."3 Similarly, the
limitations of sections 110124 and 111 also apply to the public performance
right.12 1 Separate and distinct from the previously mentioned limitations, the
public performance right is subject to other limitations in the Act. 26
E. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE

127

"Given express statutory recognition for the first time in section 107 '', 2 8 of the
1976 Act, the fair use doctrine actually originated as a common law doctrine that
became judicially recognized in Folsom v. Marsh,"' an 1841 United States Circuit
Court decision. Therein, Justice Story, giving the opinion for the court, set out
factors 3 ' for determining whether an alleged infringer's work was really a
justifiable use of a preexisting copyrighted work or an infringement. Over time,
these elements of Story's opinion were transformed into the four factors
contained in the Act's current fair use provision.
Several important judicial decisions have broadened the understanding of the
fair use doctrine, as well as aided in clarifying the scope of the factors used in
making such a determination. Two of the most influential decisions were found
in the United States Supreme Court opinions of Harper& Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enteprises and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.'3 2 In discussing the

122
123
124

See supranote 100 and accompanying text.
See supranote 98 and accompanying text.
This exemption particularly applies to performances, which are used for "face-to-face teaching

activities." 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2000).
125 See supranotes 112-26 and accompanying text.
126 Seegeneral4 17 U.S.C. § 116, 118, 119 & 122 (2000) (containing the applicable limitations to
the public performance right).
127 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (indicating the specific provisions and
implications of the fair use doctrine).
12 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
129 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
130 Justice Story suggested that a determination of a justifiable use should be made only after the
courts "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work." Id at 348.
31 471 U.S. 539,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985).
132 510 U.S. 569, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (1994).
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factors of fair use, both opinions present similar reasoning, which has become
almost standardized in any fair use analysis.
The courts generally agree that considerations of fair use should be made with
an eye toward fulfilling copyright's constitutional purpose of promoting the
34
progress of science and the useful arts.' As a mixed question of fact and law,
the doctrine of fair use often requires the court to participate in a difficult and
factually based line drawing process. Because of this process, the doctrine of fair
use differs from other legal "rules," in that there are no rigid guidelines by which
to ascertain the applicability of the doctrine. The flexibility of the doctrine, in its
operation with all the categories of copyrightable works, can be seen in the four
statutory factors used to establish fair use. These factors are not considered in
isolation, but are balanced against each other to arrive at an ultimate conclusion
as to the applicability of the fair use doctrine.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use.13
This factor focuses on the
"transformative"' 36 character of the new work (i.e. the amount of creative
originality the alleged infringer added to the work in comparison to the amount
of the work taken from the previously existing work). The Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that a commercial use or purpose alone creates a presumption against fair use. The commercialism of the allegedly infringing work must
still be balanced against the other factors. Harper & Row also points out that
because "[flair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing' " the character of
the alleged infringer's conduct should be analyzed." 7 The Court also emphasizes
that the characterization of a work as nonprofit or educational is not automatic
insulation from infringement liability. 3
2. The Nature ofthe Copyrighted Work- 39 Here, greater emphasis is given to the
fair use of fictitious versus factual works because fictitious works are perceived
as being "closer to the core of intended copyright protections."'" Also, the status
of a preexisting work as unpublished narrows the applicable scope of fair use

at 575. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.
131 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000).
1Id

134

" "[Wihether the new work merely 'supersedels] the objects' of the original creation ... or

instead adds something new, with a further purpose of different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message." Capbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
137 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,
293 F. Supp.
130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). The weight against fair use given to the alleged infringer who attempts
to exploit the preexisting work should be greater than against one who acts with permission, under
a noncompetitive spirit or for educational purposes.
138 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.

1- 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
'40

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563.
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since "the author's right to control the first public appearance
of [her] expression
4
weighs against such use of the work before its release."' '
3. TheAmount andSubstantialiyofthe Portion Used.'42 Analyzed in relation to the
whole of the preexisting copyrighted work, consideration is given to whether the
allegedly infringing work takes "the heart of the original and make[s] it the heart
of [the] new work."''
This consideration reveals the qualitative aspect and a
more likely presumption against fair use, especially if the copying was verbatim.
Similarly, the quantitative aspect relates to the number of musical phrases,
verbatim words, visual images, etc. that are taken from the original work.
Ultimately, however, the quantity and quality of "permissible copying varies with
the purpose and character of the use" as well as with the extent to which the
allegedly infringing work may affect the potential market for and value of the
original work.'"
4. The Effect on the Market.' In analyzing this factor, the courts consider the
actual market harm to the original work as well as the alleged infringer's adverse
impact on the original creator's potential market for the original and/or a
derivative work.'4 6 Fair use cannot exist if the alleged infringer's work "adversely
affects the value of any of the rights in the copyrighted work."' 7 The amount of
market harm will vary according to the facts relating to the other factors; 48 and
similarly, the market for any derivative works will depend upon "only those that
creators of [the] original works would in general develop or license others to
develop."' 9
Because the doctrine of fair use is an affirmative defense, the alleged infringer
has the burden of proof once the copyright holder has established unlawful
copying of the protected work.
IV. ANALYSIS
The previous material has provided the foundation for applicable copyright
law, which will be utilized in this section. As this Note has demonstrated, neither
the customs of the dance community nor the current status of judicial decisions
provides a sufficient scope of copyright protection for choreographic works.
4'
142
1
'4
'41

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
17 U.S.C. S 107(3) (2000).

Camobel, 510 U.S. at 587.
Id at 586-87.

17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).

14 Cawpbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
'4' Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
4 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 n.21.
"'
Id at 592.
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While the dance community's practices and sanctions are limited to those within
the dance community, the range and effect of judicial decisions is hindered by the
lack of case law on point and the dance community's reluctance to rely on the
legal profession to provide adequate assistance with this issue.
Consider the following application of the previously discussed material as it
relates to the hypothetical above. As was assumed, Lisa is the choreographer and
"author" of the choreographic sequences that Ms. Elise borrowed from Janet
Jackson's videos and ultimately incorporated into her own choreographic pieces.
Ms. Elise later taught her dance students these choreographic sequences, which
were subsequently performed in a for profit dance concert for the community.
As the creative mind behind Janet Jackson's choreography, Lisa is entitled to
the exclusive bundle of rights provided by the Copyright Act of 1976. The first
issue that presents itself is that of Lisa learning about Ms. Elise's activities. For
the purpose of this analysis and for simplicity's sake, just assume that one of
Lisa's friends, who happens to live in the community in which Arabesque
presentedits spring concert, saw the show and then informed Lisa of this possible
infringement.' °
At this point, Lisa brings suit against Ms. Elise because Lisa feels that her
rights as an artist have been violated. What preliminary facts must first be
resolved? Lisa has proof that her work has been registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office, thereby satisfying the requirements that her work be original
and fixed in a tangible medium. Before Lisa can successfully bring suit for liability
against Ms. Elise, Lisa must first demonstrate that she owns a valid copyright and
that Ms. Elise has unlawfully appropriated Lisa's copyrighted work. Lisa's
registration with the copyright office is prima facie evidence of her valid
copyright. Determining unlawful appropriation, however, will. create problems,
especially in determining whether Ms. Elise's work is an infringing derivative work
in violation of Lisa's adaptation right, as well as whether the public display and/or
performance rights have been violated in Arabesque's presentation of its spring
concert.
A. ADAPTATION RIGHT

The facts establish that Ms. Elise borrowed sequences from Lisa's work
without permission by video recording the sequences from an MTV broadcast.

'so In reality, the fact that the type of action Ms. Elise has engaged in has occurred outside the
realm of the professional dance community restrains many choreographers like Lisa from
discovering the potential infringement so that the proper legal action could be taken. To resolve this
problem, there should be performing rights societies comparable to ASCAP or BMI, which ensure
that the proper licenses are obtained for the use of copyrighted material.
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The issue is whether the borrowed sequences were enough to render the two
works substantially similar, thereby indicating an unlawful appropriation by Ms.
Elise of Lisa's protected work.
Under the substantial similarity test, there should be consideration of the
quantity and quality of the choreographic sequences appropriated from Lisa. Like
with musical compositions,"' this analysis should go to the physical number of
sequences taken, but more importantly, to whether the appropriated sequences
capture the expressive core of Lisa's choreography. The expressive core of a
choreographic work would be the sequences that an ordinary audience member
would immediately recognize as the work of a particular choreographer."s2
Likewise, the ordinary observer test would be beneficial in such a determination.
After all, it is fear that observers will mistake one author's work for another that
this test seeks to alleviate. If an observer would easily identify Ms. Elise's work
as being composed mostly of Lisa's work, there should be a greater presumption
that Ms. Elise's work is an infringing derivative work. Because choreographic
works are visual in nature, the remaining tests of unlawful appropriation would
not be suitable.
In this and similar situations, there will most likely not be a license to create
a derivative work. If one is operating within the confines of the dance community, however, the existence of a license to create a derivative choreographic work
may be worth considering.
B. THE PUBLIC DISPLAY RIGHT

The application of the public display right does not fit nicely into the
hypothetical being discussed. But theoretically, there could be a violation of this
right in certain situations. This concept goes back to the issue in Horgan v.
MacMillan."3 To the extent that a photograph could capture the image of a
copyrighted choreographic work, the display right would be violated once that
image was transmitted publicly. Therefore, Judge Feinberg's instinct that

151 The analogy to musical compositions makes sense because musical compositions are also
comprised of smaller, uncopyrightable elements that can be combined to create a protected work.
Similarly, the concerns of fixation still exist, especially for those who prefer to compose by ear and
perform from memory, but are not as serious with musical compositions because fixation in sheet
music is a common practice in the music community.
"52This concept works in much the same way as the distinctive sounds that some musical
compositions possess, which lend themselves to being recognized from the playing of just a few
notes, chords, or drum beats. Because the theme of the concert centers around Janet Jackson, there
is greater argument that the expressive core of Lisa's choreography is captured in Ms. Elise's work.
This argument may be countered, however, by saying Ms. Elise's work lacks a transformative nature.
153789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986).
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photographs could be an infringement of the copyrighted work of the NYCB was
correct, though his rationale was not. MacMillan's book would not be a derivative
work, but more likely, would violate the public display right, since it was the
images of the performances that were being captured and transmitted.
C. THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT

Because Ms. Elise is presenting a dance, consisting of protected choreographic
material directly to the community, the public performance right needs to be
analyzed. Since the public performance right applies to every phase in a
transmission process, there is potential liability at the point that Ms. Elise teaches
the borrowed sequences to her dance students. Lisa's work is still being
performed. But in this case, the requirement of public performance may have
been satisfied, since schools are generally considered semi-public and thus not
private. Ms. Elise's actions in the dance classroom may be insulated by section
110 of the Act, which exempts face-to-face teaching in the classroom or any
similar instructional setting.
The next phase in transmission would be the spring concert. The fact that the
Arabesque spring concert is for profit has no bearing on whether this right has
been infringed. The fact that Ms. Elise's work is being presented before an entire
community satisfies the requirement that the work be performed publicly.
D. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE

Once Lisa has established a prima facie case of infringement, Ms. Elise may
assert fair use as a defense. The court would balance the four statutory factors
presented in section 107 of the Act. In analyzing the purpose and character of
Ms. Elise's use, the fact that the spring concert was for profit would be weighed
against the fact that Lisa's work was used, at least partially, in an instructional

setting. As for the transformative quality, Ms. Elise does add her own creativity
to the appropriated dance sequences. The question then becomes whether Ms.

Elise's creative incorporations were enough to outweigh the sequences taken from
Lisa's protected work." 4 There is an argument, however, that Ms. Elise acted
with good faith and fair dealing in that she was not attempting intentionally to
compete with Lisa or to claim Lisa's work as her own.

Because Lisa's copyrighted work is not factual in nature, it more closely
represents the essence of the purpose of copyright protection, therefore making
"54
There is not enough information in the hypothetical to fully explore this concept. However,
since the theme of the Arabesque spring concert was focused on Janet Jackson, there can be an
inference that Ms. Elise's work may not be transformative enough.
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a finding of fair use more probable. Ms. Elise could arguably be presenting a
choreographic comment, which highlights and honors the popularity of Lisa's
choreographic creativity. Following this notion, the nature of Ms. Elise's work
would more than likely fall within the limits of permissible copying that are
illustrated by the text of section 107.
Here again, the quantity and quality of the choreographic sequences
appropriated from Lisa are considered. If it is found that Ms. Elise borrowed the
most recognized and popular choreographic sequences, that weighs against the
applicability of the fair use doctrine because Ms. Elise will have taken the heart of
Lisa's work and made it her own. This action would be similar to verbatim
copying of a substantial amount of a protected literary work. Emphasis should
be placed on the qualitative aspect, which usually proves to be more related to the
expressive nature of a work.
The effect on the market may not be a substantial factor considering that
choreography is not usually purchased. The value of choreography does not
extend far beyond the boundary of the dance community itself. Even to the
extent that a choreographer's work achieves national or international acclaim, the
value of that choreographic work as an original creation by a particular choreogra-

pher can withstand the influence of derivative works created by less popular
ss
choreographers.'
V. CONCLUSION
Once the issue of the infringement liability for choreographic works finally
reaches the courts again, the creation of a standard of liability should not be
difficult. It is simply a matter of aligning choreographic works with current legal
doctrines regarding infringement liability. A thorough and practical judicial
decision by the courts may be just what the dance community needs as a final step
toward appreciating the legal profession's approach to the copyright of choreographic works.
EDWINA M. WATKINS

'55 Notice the longevity and continued popularity of Balanchine's Nutcracker,which has been
adapted by other choreographers and performed by other dance companies. However, the success
of the NYCB continues even in the face of such competition. The same can be said for the
choreographic works of Alvin Ailey, which continue their popularity and success in the face of
adaptations by other dance companies.
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